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Wage Differentials and Market Imperfections: 
Some Cross Section Results 
in Canadian Manufacturing Industries 
J.C.H. Jones 
and 
L. Laudadio 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the extent to 
which factor and product market imperfections are respon-
sable for wage differentials. The conclusion is that without 
some form of factor market imperfection, the existence of 
imperfection in the product market cannot explain wage 
differentials. 
Standard micro theory makes inter industry wage differentials a 
function of différences in skills, non-pecuniarities, of factor market im-
perfections, (unionization, monopsony). Unfortunately, although differen-
tials are a fact of Canadian life, empirical support for received theory is 
exceedingly modest : while there is some statistical support for skill 
differentials, there is very little for non-pecuniarities or factor market 
imperfections.l 
An alternative view is that differentials are the resuit of market 
power in the product market. This proposition, although it is not based 
on received theory, does hâve the virtue of some empirical support : 
several studies hâve produced signi- |
 JONES, J.C.H., professor, Départ- I 
ment of Economies, University ol 
Victoria, Victoria, B.C. ! 
LAUDADIO, L., Chairman, Depart-
ment of Economies, University of 
Victoria, Victoria, B.C. 
ficant positive corrélations between 
wage changes and concentration (a 
proxy for market power in the 
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1
 The Canadian évidence is summarized in Sylvia OSTRY and M. A. ZAIDI, 
Labour Economies in Canada, Toronto, Macmillan, 1972, Chapt. XI. For a gênerai 
survey see, M. W. REDER « Wage Differentials : Theory and Measurement » in 
N.B.E.R., Aspect of Labor Economies, Princeton, Princeton University Press. 1962. 
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product market).2 However, this support is not universal and other 
studies, failing to produce the positive corrélations,3 hâve concluded 
that the corroborating évidence is largely spurious. 
Therefore, on the one hand we hâve a consistent body of theory 
which predicts that — from the point of view of market imperfections 
— only factar market imperfections cause differentials. Unfortunately, 
there is little empirical support for this proposition. On the other hand, 
we hâve a virtual ad hoc hypothesis which stresses product market im-
perfections and for which there is some empirical support. The only 
thing that is clear is the theoretical and empirical confusion over the rôle 
that product and factor market imperfections play in determining wage 
differentials. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the extent to which factor 
and product market imperfections are responsible for wage differentials. 
The conclusion is that without some form of factor market imperfection, 
the existence of imperfection in the product market cannot explain wage 
differentials. 
The paper is divided into three parts : I, the theoretical discussion 
of differentials and market imperfections, the formulation of a testable 
hypothesis, and the outline of the model ; II, the empirical results ; III, 
a conclusion. 
2 T. W. GABARINO, « A Theory of Interindustry Wage Structure Variation », 
Quarterly Journal of Economies, May, 1950 ; W. G. BOWEN, Wage Behaviour in 
the Postwar Period : An Empirical Analyse, Princeton, Industrial Relations Section, 
1960 ; H. M. LEVINSON, « Postwar Movements of Priées and Wages in Manu-
facturing Industries » Joint Economie Committee, Study of Income, Employment 
and Priées, Study Paper No. 21. Washington 1960; F. M. SCHERER, Industrial 
Market Structure and Economie Performance, Chicago, Rand McNally, 1970, pp. 
300-301. In Canada, OSTRY and ZAIDI found a «weak . . . positive relationship 
between market concentration and levels of earnings», ibid., p. 314. 
3 D. SCHWARTZMAN, « Monopoly and Wages » Canadian Journal of Econo-
mies and Political Sciences, Aug. 1960 ; H.G. LEWIS, Unionism and Relative 
Wages in the United States, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1963 ; O. E. 
ECKSTEIN and T. A. WILSON, «The Détermination of Money Wages in Ame-
rican Industry », Quarterly Journal of Economies, Aug. 1962 B. T. ALLEN, 
« Market Concentration and Wage Increases : U. S. Manufacturing, 1947-1964 », 
Industrial and Labour Relations Review, April 1968. L. W. WEISS reported positive 
significant corrélations between concentration and labour earnings, which disap-
peared when « personal characteristics were introduced », « Concentration and Labor 
Earnings », American Economie Review, March 1966. 
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WAGE DIFFERENTIALS AND MARKET IMPERFECTIONS : 
THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The Theory 
To understand the contribution of factor and product market im-
pections to wage differentials it is necessary to start with received theory. 
Hère two points are crucial : (i) product market imperfections by them-
selves cannot produce wage differentials ; and the corrolary of (i) is 
that, ceteris paribus, (ii) differentials can only exist if factor market 
imperfections exist. Briefly the argument is as follows. 
(i) If it is assumed that labour is homogeneous, non-pecuniarities 
and market imperfections are absent, and firms désire to maximize profits, 
then labour will receive a uniform wage regardless of the degree of im-
perfection in the product market. 
In the absence of monopolistic éléments in the product market, the 
wage will be the highest possible consistent with maximum output and 
employment. However, if a segment of the product market becomes 
monopolized, the initial conséquence will be a réduction in output, em-
ployement and wages, so that a temporary discrepancy will exist between 
the wage paid by the monopolized and the compétitive industries. But 
as the unemployed and underpaid labour shifts out of the monopolized 
into the compétitive sector it acts to depress the wage in the compétitive 
sector. The movement toward equilibrium is a movement toward wage 
uniformity, although the wage will be lower and employment and output 
smaller than they were when compétitive conditions prevailed in both 
sectors. 
(ii) Given (i) , differentials are caused solely by factor market 
imperfections. Hère we hâve two types of imperfection — monopsony 
power possessed by employers and monopoly power possessed by labour 
—- which may interact with each other to produce wage differentials. The 
type of differential then obviously dépends on the type of imperfection 
and the existence of the interaction. For example, in the absence of 
labour organizations, firms with monopsony power will pay lower wages 
than firms with no monopsony power. If thèse firms also hâve some 
power in the product market they may realize pure profits, but if they 
do not their very existence may dépend on the exploitation of labour. 
Contrariwise if unions successfully countervail the power of employers, 
wages and employment will tend to increase in the industries v/ith some 
power in the product market. But, a union's ability to raise wages may 
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resuit in forcing a firm out of business if it is operating in a compétitive 
product market. 
Beyond thèse generalizations the existence of differentials dépends 
on specifying the interaction between product and factor markets. The 
common situation - and also the most complex - is one where employers 
possessing various degrees of power in the product market bargain with 
labour organizations of varying strength. However, since there is no 
gênerai theory of either oligopoly or union behaviour, received theory 
has little to contribute to the solution of the interaction problem. Never-
theless, our working hypothesis is that, even in this interaction context, 
product market imperfections are not sufficient to produce wage differen-
tials and must be accompanied by factor market imperfections. 
To elaborate on this statement of the hypothesis, let us assume that 
one of the major purposes of labour organizations is to raise the wage 
above the level determined by the market and at the same time to main-
tain employment. It follows that union activity will be more visible in 
those industries which, in the opinion of labour leaders, can be made to 
acquiesce to the higher wage demands without reducing greatly employ-
ment opportunities for union members. This means that there is not much 
scope for union activity in the compétitive sector of the economy because, 
since profits of compétitive firms tend toward zéro, demands for higher 
wages can be met only at risk of reduced employment. In such circum-
stances the effectiveness of unions could not be expected to be very great. 
On the other hand, if oligopolistic firms operate undisturbed by 
union demands they will pay the going wage and if pure profits exist 
they will remain intact. Therefore a union has the potential of getting 
higher wages only in those industries where pure profits are known to 
exist. Thèse industries are necessarily the ones characterized by some 
degree of market power in the product market. 
If this is correct we expect the following testable hypothèses. First, 
a positive relationship between wages and union power. Second, a posi-
tive relationship between wages and concentration (a proxy for product 
market power). However, this latter expectation is based on the crucial 
assumption of a positive corrélation between unionization and concentra-
tion. This means that concentration exerts no independent influence on 
wages and the wage-concentration relationship is spurious. 
Whether thèse hypothèses are true in practice is, of course, an 
empirical matter. 
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The Régression Model 
In this paper we use multiple régression techniques to test the 
above hypothèses. The complète régression model spécifies that wage 
differentials are a function of : the degree of market power in the product 
market, which can be altematively measured by concentration (national 
and régional), and profits ; the degree of imperfection in the factor 
market, which is measured altematively by degree of unionization and 
unemployment ; productivity and demand. 
The variables are defined as follows (see also Appendix (i)) . 
Dépendent Variables 
Wages = W = ratio of wages to production worker man hours. 
Independent Variables 
Concentration Con4 
Régional Compétition = RG 
— four firm concentration ra-
tio by value of factory 
shipments. 
= a dummy variable of 1 if 
identifiable régional con-
centration exists. 
Profits = P /E = ratio of profits to equity. 
Unionization = U = percentage of non-office 
employées covered by col-
lective agreements. 
Interaction Variable = U*Con4 = (U)(con4)/100. 
Unemployment = UN — equals industry unemploy-
ment rate. 
Productivity = Prod = equals value of factory 
shipments/production 
worker man hours. 
Demand = D = ratio of industry shipments 
at time t+n to industry 
shipments at time t. 
The following points should be noted about the content and spéci-
fication of the model. 
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(i) Most of the independent variables hâve appeared in one form 
or another in previous studies of wage differentials4 and require little 
additional explanation. However, the addition of RG, P/E, and U*Con4 
as product market variables does require some further comment. The 
variable concentration (Con4) is almost universally used as the proxy 
for power in the product market. But, since national Con4 ratios pro-
bably provide an underestimate of the degree of market power if régional 
concentration is ignored, we introduce régional concentration (RG). 
In addition to thèse structural variables we introduce a performance 
variable, profits (P/E). The reason is that, since the corrélation between 
concentration and performance variables has never been that high, 5 and 
as some studies of differentials hâve achieved better statistical results 
using performance rather than structural variables,6 P/E is introduced 
as an alternative proxy for market power. 
The introduction of U*Con4 is an attempt, following Lewis, Weiss 
and Scherer, 7 to disentangle the complex relationship between unioniza-
tion and concentration. We hâve argued above that the expected positive 
wage-concentration relationship is spurious, largely determined by a 
strong corrélation between wages and the degree of unionization, which 
is itself correlated with concentration. However, as other authors8 hâve 
suggested that concentration has an independent influence on wages, 
the variable U*Con4 provides some test of thèse alternatives. 
(ii) We assume a continuous linear relationship between the dé-
pendent variables and ail independent variables. Then, given the above 
définitions of the variables, we expect the following a priori relationships 
4
 See the studies listed in footnotes 2 and 3 above. 
5
 In gênerai see the studies reviewed by J. M. VERNON, Market Structure 
and Industrial Performance : A Review of Statistical Findings, Boston, Allyn and 
Bacon, 1972. For some Canadian évidence see J. C. H. JONES, L. LAUDADIO 
and M. PERCY, «Market Structure and Profitability in Canadian Manufacturing 
Industry : Some Cross Section Results, » Canadian Journal of Economies, Aug. 
1973. 
6 See, for example, ECKSTEIN and WILSON, op. cit. 
7 Op. cit. 
8
 In gênerai see those articles listed in footnote 2 and, Martin SEGAL, «The 
Relation Between Union Wage Impact and Market Structure », Quarterly Journal 
of Economies, Feb. 1964, and H. M. LEVINSON, « Unionism, Concentration and 
Wage Changes : Towards a Unified Theory », Industrial and Labour Relations 
Review, Jan. 1967. 
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between dépendent and independent variables : a positive relationship 
for Con4, RG, P/E, U, Prod, D ; a négative relationship for UN ; while 
U*Con4 could not be specified. 
(iii) The data in the model is derived from two cross section sam-
ples of 51 three and four digit manufacturing industries for 1965 and 
1969. The size and composition of the sample was determined by how 
well the available data from the existing sources matched (see Appendix 
ii). Two comments on the nature of data and the implication for testing 
the hypothèses are necessary. 
First, the use of cross section data means that we are attempting 
to relate the wage level at a given point in Urne to various independent 
variables. However, much of the testing of wage differential models has 
utilized partial time séries data making wage changes over time the dé-
pendent variable. 9 Since appropriate time séries data is unavailable in 
Canada, our findings are not strictly comparable with thèse studies. Al-
though ideally the use of both time séries and cross section data would 
be désirable, the use of cross section data alone does hâve advantages. 
In the first place, it gets away from the fréquent criticism that a positive 
corrélation between wage change and concentration implies an increasing 
wage level differential over time between highly concentrated and atom-
istic industries, which unfortunately rarely shows up. 1 0 
In addition, we cannot afford to ignore the fact that économie con-
ditions change and that wage contracts limit the freedom of response 
of both unions and highly concentrated firms, but do nothing to impair 
the freedom of non-union labour and compétitive forms. This means 
that if we use wage change data we might not obtain a good test of the 
wage-concentration hypothesis. That is, although we expect changes in 
wages to be positively correlated with industry concentration, it is not 
difficult to visualize the opposite occurring. If économie activity is in-
creasing rapidly, the demand for labour will also rise, and the expected 
resuit would be an increase in wages. But if labour is bound by a pre-
viously negotiated contract, the change in wages will not occur until the 
contract expires. If, however, labour is not bound by a contract the in-
9 For exemple, ALLEN, op. cit., GABARINO, op. cit., BOWEN, op. cit., 
LEVINSON « Postwar Movements of Prices and Wages in Manufacturing Indus-
tries. » 
10 See REDER, op. cit., pp. 291-296; and Albert REES, The Economies of 
Trade Unions, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1962, pp. 84-85. 
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crease in wage will be immédiate. Therefore, the partial régression coeffi-
cient for concentration would be insignificant or even négative. This 
problem is minimized with cross section data. 
Second, even for the cross section analysis the data is not consistent. 
For example, unemployment (UN) by industry is only available from the 
1961 Census of Canada. In addition, the variables Con4, and P/E, are 
only available for 1965, while the degree of unionization (U) is only 
available for 1969. 
The régression results are detailed below. 
WAGE DIFFERENTIALS AND MARKET IMPERFECTIONS: 
THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Tables I and II show the results of multiple régression équations 
relating W to various combinations of the independent variables outlined 
above, for 1965 and 1969 respectively. With minor exceptions both tables 
show the same pattern in terms of the corrélations coefficients and the 
signs, sizes, and levels of significance of the individual coefficients : the 
R2 are not consistently higher in one year than the other ; the signs of the 
individual coefficients differ only in one instance (the insignificant 
U*Con4 in équation 3) ; the coefficients are slightly higher in Table II 
but there are exceptions ; and only in équation 6 are the t values con-
sistently higher in 1969 than 1965. The statistical results in both tables 
are therefore very compatible. 
The major hypothèses — that unionization and concentration are 
positively related to wages — are accepted if the coefficients U and 
Con4 are significant and positive. In Tables I and II, Con4 is positive 
and its level of significance varies between 5 and 10 per cent. The coef-
ficient U is also positive and its level of significance varies between 1 
and 10 per cent. Its significance increases (see équations 4 and 5) parti-
cularly when Con4 and U*Con4 are dropped. This is primarily a resuit 
of the multicollinearity involved which is not unexpected particularly 
given the définition of U*Con4. n Therefore, the hypothèses must be 
tentatively accepted. However, because U*Con4 is not statistically signif-
11
 This is clear from the partial corrélation coefficients for thèse three va-
riables. 
TABLE 1 
Multiple Régression Analysis, 1 1965 
W = Ao +
 3 l ( U ) + a2(Con4) + a3(U*Con4) + a4(RG) 
+ a5(UN) + a6(Prod) + a7(D) + a8(P/E) 
Equa 
tion Ao U Con4 U*Con4 RG UN Prod D P/E R2 R2 n 
1 116.836 0.759*** 
(3.738) (1.532) 
0.992*** 
(1.423) 
- 0 . 2 4 8 
( - 0 . 2 6 6 ) 
.423 .386 51 
H-l 
2 115.982 0.745*** 
(3.666) (1.488) 
0.979*** 
(1.390) 
- 0 . 2 1 5 
( - 0 . 2 2 8 ) 
4.094 
(0.362) 
.425 .375 51 
Vi 
3 67.443 0.649*** 
(1.379) (1.391) 
0.324 
(0.466 
0.226 
(0.258) 
0.167 
(0.040) 
1.085* 
(3.044) 
0.311*** 
(1.395) 
1.413 
(1.266) 
.570 .500 51 
4 74.639 0.992* 
(1.871) (4.350) 
- 1 . 8 9 3 
( - 0 . 4 6 2 ) 
1.238* 
(3.545) 
0.255 
(1-153) 
1.790*** 
(1.660) 
.534 .482 51 m 
r 
g 
o 
5 64.682 1.123* 
(1.869) (5.159) 
1.376* 
(4.290) 
0.313*** 
(1.419) 
.502 .471 51 3 
2? 
6 62.173 0.822*** 
(1.328) (1.679) 
1.142*** 
(1.646) 
- 0 . 4 0 6 
( _ 0.440) 
0.367*** 
(1.550) 
.452 .404 51 
H 
7 
régression coefficients was tested 
- 9 . 1 9 7 * * 
( - 1 . 9 6 8 ) 
using a one-tail t test. The t values 
3.577* 
(2.808) 
are shown 
.222 .190 51 
in parenthesis. 
W 
1 The significance of the Û 
r 
The significance of the 
* significant at 99 per 
** significant at 95 per 
R2 was testeu using an 
cent. 
cent. 
F test and ali R2 were significant. p 
o 
TABLE 2 
W = Ao + 
Multiple Régression 
ax(U) + a2(Con4) + a; 
4- a5(UN) + a6(Prod)' 
Analysis, 1 1969 
,(U*Con4) + a 4 (A/Q) 
+ a7(D) + a 8 (P/E) 
+ a4(RG^ 
rAGE
 D
iFFER] 
Equa-
tion Ao U Con4 U*Con4 RG UN Prod D P/E R2 R2 n 
H 
> 
r 
1 151.290 
(3.559) 
1.035** = 
(1.537) 
1.375*** 
(1.451) 
- 0 . 4 1 3 
( - 0 . 3 2 6 ) 
.410 .372 51 
> Z 
o 
2 148.333 
(3.475) 
0.990* * : 
(1.464) 
1.331*** 
(1.401) 
- 0 . 2 9 9 
( - 0 . 2 3 5 ) 
14.182 
(0.930) 
.420 .370 51 > 
3 70.124 
(1.093) 
1.035** 
(1.684) 
0.679 
(0.747) 
- 0 . 0 9 0 
( - 0 . 0 7 9 ) 
1.430 
(0.261) 
1.386* 
(3.608) 
0.438*** 
(1.492) 
1.289 
(0.877) 
.587 .520 51 
4 92.217 
(1.803) 
1.293* 
(4.330) ( 
- 1 . 1 3 9 
- 0 . 2 1 3 ) 
1.572* 
(4.207) 
0.345 
(1.194) 
1.857*** 
(1.312) 
.557 .508 51 tn O 
H 
5 86.842 
(1.958) 
1.420* 
(5.029) 
1.670* 
(4.912) 
0.395*** 
(1.383) 
.539 .510 51 
6 68.195 
(1.078) 
1.132** 
(1.711) 
1.603** 
(1.711) 
- 0 . 6 5 4 
( - 0 . 5 2 4 
0.558** 
(1.744) 
.446 .398 51 0 
W 
o 
7 
( 
-12 .023** 
- 1 . 8 8 3 ) 
4.442** 
(2.552) 
.196 .163 51 o 
en 
«2 
1
 The significance of the régression coefficients was tested using a one-tail t test. The t values are shown in parenthesis. 
The significance of the R2 was tested using an F test and ail R2 were significant. 
* significant at 99 per cent. 
** significant at 95 per cent. 
*** significant at 90 per cent. 
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icant, no definite statement on whether the wage-concentration relation-
ship is spurious or not, is possible.12 
Con4 U*Con4 
U .5400 .7755 
Con4 .9146 
On balance we can conclude that, the union-wage relationship con-
fions what we would expect regarding the influence of factor market 
imperfections on differentials ; but it is not clear whether product market 
imperfections hâve an independent influence on differentials. 
When other independent variables are added the explanatory power 
of the model is increased (compare équation 3 with équation 1). Al-
though the structural variable RG turns out to be insignificant (équation 
2), the variables Prod and D are significant and hâve the anticipated 
sign. In particular Prod is strong throughout (équations 3, 4 and 5) 
and indeed, factor market imperfections (U) coupled with Prod and D 
(équation 5) provide a robust explanation of wage differentials. 
The introduction of UN and P/E as alternative proxies for factor 
and product market variables provide mixed results. They only become 
decisively significant with the expected signs in équation 7 when ail other 
variables are dropped. However, R2 falls to .19. In équation 3 and 4 
12
 If U*Con4 had been statistically significant the key to whether product 
market imperfections had an independent influence on wage dépends on the sign 
of this variable. Given that in both Tables I and II both Con4 and U are 
separately statistically significant, and positive, variables, the négative sign for 
their interaction can be explained as follows. In those industries where the degree 
of unionization is low, wages clearly increase with increasing concentration. In 
those industries where concentration is already high, the degree of unionization 
appears to hâve a dampening effect on wages. Putting it in a différent way, the 
wage impact of increasing unionization is greater in low concentration Industries 
and diminishes as the concentration increases. This leads to the tentative conclusion 
that concentration exerts an independent, and positive, influence on v/age dif-
ferentials, which is almost identical to Scherer's conclusions {op. cit., pp. 300-301). 
The conclusion is of course « tentative » because U*Con4 is not statistically signi-
ficant. 
Had the sign of U*Con4 been positive, it would hâve been possible to 
conclude that this was the resuit of the relationship between concentration and 
unionization. This in turn would indicate that Con4 itself exerts no independent 
influence on wages. 
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UN is not significant (and once has an unanticipated sign), while P /E 
is significant at the 10 per cent level only in équation 4. Since P /E is 
significant only when Con4 and U*Con4 are removed (équations 4 and 
7) , and Con4 becomes insignificant only when P / E is introduced (équa-
tion 3) , it appears as if the structural and the performance variables are, 
to some degree, substitute proxies. 
In summary we can say that, on the basis of Tables I and II, the 
major hypothèses are accepted, although the addition of Prod and D 
improves the explanatory power of the model. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion we can say that the empirical évidence in this paper 
supports the gênerai proposition that ceteris paribus factor market im-
perfections are necessary for the existence of wage differentials. Speci-
fically, the évidence supports the usual contention that unions are ins-
trumental in bringing about differentials. 
However, the évidence does not precisely indicate the magnitude of 
the differential that can be ascribed to unions alone without thé présence 
of oligopoliste market structures. But the évidence likewise fails to in-
dicate the magnitude of the differential which can be ascribed to the 
présence of oligopoly without the constraint of union power. Obviously, 
more empirical work is necessary to sort out the wage differential — 
concentration relationship. While such empirical investigations will doubt-
less run into major data problems, it appears to us that the prime ob-
stacle to more fruitful work in this area is the lack of formai theoretical 
models that relate power in the product market to wage differentials 
that may exist even without factor market imperfections. 
APPENDIX 
(i) Variable Définitions and Data Sources 
Appendix Table 1 
Variable Définition and Source 
W = ratio of wages to production-marker man hours, 1965 and 1969: 
D.B.S. Annual Census of Manufacturer s, 1970. 
Con4 — four firm concentration ratio: Department of Consumer and Cor-
porate Affairs, Concentration in the Manufacturing Industries in 
Canada. (Ottawa, Information Canada, 1971). 
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U = percentage of non-office employées covered by collective agreements 
in 1969: Department of Labour, Working Conditions in Canadian 
Industry, 1969 (Ottawa, 1970). 
U*Con4 = (U) (Con4)/100. 
RG = régional concentration dummy has value of 1 for ail industries 
identified as regionally concentrated in Concentration of Manufac-
turing Industries of Canada, 1971. 
P/E = ratio of profits to equity in 1965: D.B.S. Corporation Financial Sta-
tistics, 1965. 
UN = industry unemployment rate in 1961: D.B.S. Census of Canada, 
1961. 
Prod = value of factory shipments/production worker man hours: D.B.S. 
Annual Census of Manufacturer s, 1970. 
D = ratio of industry shipments in 1969 to 1965. D.B.S. Annual Census 
of Manufacturer s, 1970. 
(ii) The Sample 
The size and content of the sample was determined by the matching of in-
dustries in the sources shown in Appendix Table I with the Standard Industries 
Classification, 1960. This produced the following 51 industry sample : 
Méat Products 
Dairy Products 
Fish Products 
Grain Mills 
Biscuit Manufacturers 
Bakeries 
Confectionary Manufacturers 
Soft Drink Manufacturers 
Breweries 
Tobacco Products 
Rubber Footwear Manufacturers 
Rubber Tire and Tube Manufacturers 
Other Rubber Products 
Tanneries 
Shoe Factories 
Wool Yarn and Cloth Mills 
Synthetic Textile Mills 
Knitting Mills 
Men's Clothing Industry 
Pulp and Paper Mills 
Paper Boxes and Bags Manufacturers 
Iron and Steel Mills 
Iron Foundries 
Boiler and Plate Works 
Structural, Ornamental and 
Architectural Métal Industry 
Wire and Wire Products Manufacturers 
Heating Equipment Manufacturers 
Machine Shops 
Agricultural Implements Industry 
Miscellaneous Machinery and 
Equipment Manufacturers 
Office and Store Machinery 
Manufacturers 
Aircraft and Parts Manufacturers 
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers 
Motor Vehicle Parts and Accessories 
Manufacturers 
Shipbuilding and Repair 
WAGE DIFFERENTIALS AND MARKET IMPERFECTIONS : SOME CROSS . . . 421 
Women's Clothing Industry 
Children's Clothing Industry 
Fur Goods Industry 
Saw, Shingle, and Planning Mills 
Veneer and Plywood Mills 
Sash, Door and Flooring Mills 
Ail Fumiture Industries 
Paint and Varnish Manufacturer 
Manufacture of Industrial Chemicals 
Manufacture of Small Electrical 
Appliances 
Manufacture of Major Appliances 
Manufacture of Household Radio and 
T.V. Receivers 
Communications Equipment 
Manufacturer 
Manufacture of Electrical Industrial 
Equipment 
Petroleum Refineries 
Manufacture of Pharmaceutical and 
Medicines and Toilet Préparations 
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Les différences de salaires et les imperfections du marché : 
comparaisons dans l'industrie manufacturière canadienne 
Dans l'article précédent, l'auteur tente de démontrer dans quelle mesure les 
imperfections des marchés des produits et des facteurs de production sont respon-
sables des différences de salaire. L'article se divise en trois parties. La première 
partie est consacrée à l'examen théorique des différences de salaire et des imper-
fections des marchés, à la formulation d'une hypothèse vérifiable et à l'ébauche 
d'un modèle. La deuxième partie rend compte des résultats concrets obtenus. S'y 
ajoute enfin une conclusion. 
Théoriquement, deux points apparaissent importants. En elles-mêmes, les im-
perfections du marché des produits ne peuvent engendrer les différences de sa-
laire ; d'autre part, ces différences ne peuvent exister que s'il y a des imperfec-
tions sur le marché des facteurs, autrement dit, si, du côté de l'employeur, il y a 
monopole ou si, de l'autre, les syndicats sont très puissants. 
Par la théorie, on ne peut guère être éclairé sur ce qui se passe généralement 
lorsqu'il y a interaction du marché des produits et du marché des facteurs. Globale-
ment, selon notre hypothèse, l'existence conjointe d'un syndicalisme fort et la si-
tuation de monopole de l'entreprise exerceraient une certaine influence sur la né-
gociation des salaires. Pour approfondir cette hypothèse, il s'agissait de prendre 
pour acquis que l'objectif principal des syndicats est de faire augmenter les salaires 
au-dessus du niveau du marché des facteurs tout en maintenant le niveau de l'em-
ploi. Il s'ensuit que l'action syndicale sera beaucoup plus perceptible dans les in-
dustries qui, de l'avis des dirigeants syndicaux, sont en mesure d'accepter des 
hausses de salaire sans réduire les occasions d'emploi pour les membres du syndi-
cat. Ceci signifie qu'il n'y a guère de marge pour l'action syndicale dans les sec-
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teurs très concurrentiels de l'économie, étant donné que les profits des entreprises 
tendent alors vers le point zéro, et que, en conséquence, on ne peut y obtenir d'aug-
mentation de salaire sans risquer de provoquer une réduction des emplois. Dans 
les circonstances, on ne peut s'attendre à ce que l'efficacité des syndicats y soit 
très grande. 
D'autre part, si les entreprises monopolisées fonctionnement sans être trou-
blées par les revendications des syndicats, elles paieront les taux de salaire cou-
rants et, s'il y a profit clair, il restera intact. Par conséquent, un syndicat ne peut 
obtenir de hausses de salaire que dans les industries où l'on sait qu'il y a des 
profits clairs. Ces industries sont nécessairement celles qui détiennent une certaine 
exclusivité sur le marché des produits. 
Si ceci est exact, les hypothèses suivantes peuvent se vérifier. En premier lieu, 
on notera un rapport positif entre les taux de salaire et la puissance du syndicat. 
En deuxième lieu, il y a aussi un rapport positif etnre les salaires et la concentra-
tion qui favorise la puissance de l'entreprise sur le marché. Toutefois, cette der-
nière prévision se fonde sur l'hypothèse déterminante d'une corrélation entre le 
degré de syndicalisation et le degré de concentration, ce qui voudrait dire que 
la concentration n'exerce aucune influence sur les salaires et que le rapport salaire-
concentration est faux. 
En utilisant surtout les données relatives à la concentration, aux profits, au 
degré de syndicalisation et à la productivité, nous avons examiné leur impact sur 
les salaires en recourant à la technique de la régression multiple pour évaluer à la 
fois les coefficients des séries chronologiques et des échantillonnages. Le résultat 
le plus marquant qu'on a obtenu de cette analyse peut se formuler ainsi : des syn-
dicats puissants et une situation d'oligopole sur le marché exercent une influence 
positive certaine sur les salaires. Cependant, on ne sait pas par là l'ampleur des 
différences de salaire dont on peut attribuer la responsabilité aux syndicats lorsque 
l'on ne décèle pas la présence d'oligopole sur le marché. On ne connaît pas plus 
d'ailleurs l'ampleur des différences de salaire attribuables à la présence d'un oli-
gopole sans pression de la part des syndicats. Naturellement, il faudrait poursuivre 
plus avant les analyses pour faire le départ entre la différence dans les salaires et 
le degré de concentration du marché. 
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